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Abstract: Despite its diverse makeup and deep divisions, Canada has a fairly solid 
reputation as a stable democracy and political community but we are repeatedly reminded 
how fragile this "community of communities" may in fact be. Using new data from the 
Comparative Provincial Election Project, we examine how Quebecers feel about Canada and 
Quebec and compare these perspectives to those of other Canadians. We find that support 
varies provincially, over time and across subnational political communities. And in Quebec, 
political performance has a strong bearing on support for political communities, even after 
controlling for other common cultural, structural or contextual explanations. 
 
Keywords: political support, political community, government performance, federalism, 
Quebec, Comparative Provincial Election Project 
 
Résumé: Malgré sa diversité et ses divisions, le Canada a la réputation d'une démocratie et 
communauté politique relativement stable. Ceci dit, les occasions sont nombreuses où nous 
est rappelée la fragilité de cette ‘communauté de communautés’. En employant de 
nouvelles données du 'Comparative Provincial Election Project', nous observons que les 
perspectives des Canadiens envers leurs communautés politiques provinciales et fédérales 
diffèrent selon les provinces, la période et la communauté politique en question. Nos 
résultats suggèrent que pour les Québécois, l’attention portée à la performance politique a 
une forte incidence sur l’appui des citoyens, en tenant compte des variations culturels, 
structurels et contextuelles. 
 
Mots-clés : appui politique, communauté politique, performance du gouvernement, 
fédéralisme, Québec, Comparative Provincial Election Project  
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Theoretical Framework 
 
 Unlike other articles in this edition, 
our contribution does not address voting 
behaviour directly. Rather, we focus 
primarily on Canadians’ outlooks toward 
their federal and provincial political 
communities, a theme central to most 
discussions of Canadian politics1. The 
Quebec component of the Comparative 
Provincial Election Project (CPEP) makes 
it possible to study different aspects of 
political support in Quebec. How do 
Quebecers today feel about Canada and 
Quebec? How do Quebecers’ perspectives 
compare with how other Canadians view 
their federal and respective provincial 
communities? And, what determines how 
Quebecers perceive these two political 
communities? 
The literature on “political 
support” (Easton 1965, 1975, 1976; 
Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Norris 1999, 
2011, 2012; Nevitte 2002; Dalton 2004) 
consistently suggests that people can and 
do differentiate between what they like 
and dislike about different political 
objects (see also Kanji and Tannahill 
2013, 2013a, 2014, 2014a. What citizens 
make of their political authorities and 
government institutions need not be 
consistent with the way they feel about 
the workings of their political system 
overall, their political regime, or their 
political community.2 Also, the theory on 
political support leads us to expect that 
citizens’ feelings toward more diffuse 
objects, such as their political 
communities, are likely to be more affect-
oriented3, more positive and more stable 
in character than support for more 
specific objects, such as parties or 
politicians (Easton 1965; Kornberg and 
Clarke 1992; Klingemann 1999; Norris 
1999, 2011; Dalton 1999, 2004). This 
does not mean however, that outlooks 
toward political communities are any less 
relevant. On the contrary, Norris (2011: 
79) warns that orientations toward 
political community can “have 
particularly significant consequences for 
social cohesion and state legitimacy in 
multicultural communities and plural 
societies”, and this is especially pertinent 
in societies such as Canada. 
        Much of the early Canadian 
evidence is consistent with the data 
presented in other societies. It suggests 
that support for the Canadian political 
community is relatively strong and fairly 
stable (Kornberg and Stewart 1983; 
Kornberg and Clark 1992; Clarke, 
Kornberg and Wearing 2000). However, 
there is also some evidence that indicates 
that support for political communities 
may vary across different communities 
and regions. For instance, Kornberg, 
Clarke and Stewart (1979) found that 
“there are statistically significant 
variations in the level of support that 
Canadians in several regions ascribe to 
national and provincial political 
communities...[and that] regional 
variations in support for the Canadian 
political community are especially 
pronounced...and lowest in Quebec” (895-
896).  Also, this literature suggests that 
support for provincial political 
communities tends to be lower than 
support for the Canadian political 
community.  And there are reasons to 
suppose that support for political 
communities may be more variable in 
some regions than it is in others. For 
instance, evidence indicates that support 
for the provincial political community in 
Quebec may now be stronger than 
support for the Canadian political 
community. According to Nadeau and 
Bélanger (2012: 147), after the failure of 
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the Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
accords, “an important gap appeared 
between [Quebecers’] levels of 
attachment to Quebec (increasing to 79) 
and to Canada (falling to 61)”. Yet, more 
recent evidence [from the 2006 Canadian 
Election Studies] suggests that the 
proportion of Francophones who support 
the Canadian political community “is 
clearly on the rise (now at 74).” 
In this article, we examine evidence 
from the CPEP, focusing primarily on the 
data from Quebec but also whenever 
possible, comparing our findings to those 
in other provinces and at other time 
points. Our focus on Quebec is driven 
partly by the history of fluctuations in 
Quebecers’ outlooks toward various 
political  makes it both compelling and 
theoretically relevant to investigate if 
things have shifted yet again.  Also, 
Quebec’s membership in the Canadian 
political community continues to be a 
contentious issue,4 which makes it 
important to follow Quebecers' outlooks 
toward their respective provincial and 
federal political communities in the event 
that there are relevant findings to relay. 
Lastly, the Quebec component of the 
CPEP, with its expanded set of questions, 
makes it possible to conduct such a study 
in that it allows us to compare different 
measures of political community support 
employed in the literature and to test the 
significance of various alternative 
explanations. 
In terms of potential explanations 
for support for political communities, the 
literature alerts us to several possibilities. 
For example, Norris (2011) contends that 
political support may be tied to basic 
underperformance. In particular, there 
are at least two theoretical variants of the 
underperformance argument that merit 
consideration when it comes to support 
for political communities in the Canadian 
case. The first has to do specifically with 
the workings of the federal political 
system and power relations across 
different levels of government. Kornberg, 
Clarke and Stewart (1979: 891) suggest 
that perceived inequalities resulting from 
federalism through either the “allocation 
of costs and benefits” and/or the division 
of powers can affect outlooks toward 
political communities. A second variant of 
the underperformance argument suggests 
that low levels of support for specific 
political objects such as political 
authorities, institutions more broadly, the 
way a democracy works in general and/or 
a political regime’s core principles might 
also detract from people’s support for a 
political community. According to 
Kornberg, Clarke (1992: xv) and others 
(Norris 1999, 2011 or Dalton 2004), 
support for political objects “flows 
‘upward’ – from authorities, to regime, to 
community.” So if political authorities and 
institutions are perceived to be 
performing poorly (particularly for a 
sustained period of time) there is a 
chance that this “may generalize to 
broader evaluations of the regime and the 
political community” (Dalton 2011: 63) 
Various structural and cultural 
shifts that are commonly associated with 
the transition from industrialism to post-
industrialism provide an alternative set of 
potential explanations for differences in 
support for political communities. For 
instance, Dalton’s (2006) cognitive 
mobilization thesis suggests that because 
citizens in advanced industrial societies 
are better educated, more interested and 
more engaged in politics than generations 
past, they may have a greater conviction 
for the democratic process (see also 
Norris 1999, 2011).  Patterson (1994) and 
others (see, for instance, Norris 2000) on 
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the other hand, claim that greater public 
exposure to negative news may also be 
partly to blame for declining levels of 
support across various societies.5  And 
Nevitte (2002: 22) suggests that cognitive 
mobilization and the information 
explosion may contribute to a growing 
“efficacy gap” in politics, in which citizens’ 
“own subjective political competence has 
been sustained, [while] their evaluations 
of the responsiveness of their own 
political system have been declining.” 
This too may make citizens more critical 
when it comes to different objects of 
support.   
 In a similar vein, Inglehart (1990, 
1997) and others (Inglehart and Welzel 
2005; Nevitte 1996) suggest that the 
changing value orientations of post-
materialist generations have made them 
less deferential and more inclined to 
challenge institutional authority than 
older, more material generations. In 
addition, Putnam’s theory on declining 
social capital (2000) claims that because 
citizens in several societies today are not 
as interactive,6 they are less likely to trust 
one another or to be as cohesive. Both of 
these developments might also have 
implications for the extent to which 
citizens in societies support their political 
communities.  
Lastly, there is the additional 
possibility that Quebecers’ outlooks 
toward their respective political 
communities might be tied to a variety of 
contextual factors. The most obvious of 
these is the tension that perpetuates 
between those who are more likely to 
support the Canadian political community 
(such as federalists or nationalists) and 
those who are more likely to favour an 
independent Quebec (namely 
sovereignists and separatists), a tension 
that plays out politically through the 
continued presence of separatist parties 
at both the federal and provincial levels. 
Other demographic and background 
characteristics such as language may also 
influence support for different political 
communities. Given the longstanding role 
that the Quebec government has played in 
preserving and favouring the French 
culture, we would expect that 
Francophones would support the 
provincial political community more so 
than the Canadian one and particularly 
more so than non-Francophones. 
Likewise, other factors such as age, 
gender, income, and place of birth 
(Kornberg and Clarke 1992) may also 
have important implications and they too 
are important to consider as a result.  
 
Methodology 
 
As mentioned above, the data for 
this analysis are drawn primarily from 
the CPEP.7 This country-wide study 
utilizes a standardized survey instrument 
to examine electoral behaviour and 
outlooks toward Canadian democracy on 
a province-by-province basis. These data 
make it possible to conduct investigations 
of provincial populations with more 
significant sample sizes, which is 
something that more conventional 
surveys such as the Canadian Election 
Studies (CES)8 cannot always adequately 
support (Kanji, Bilodeau and Scotto 
2012). Also, the Quebec component of the 
CPEP is based on an expanded 
questionnaire that makes it possible to 
conduct even deeper investigations of 
different objects of political support 
across both the federal and provincial 
levels, while controlling for a variety of 
theoretically relevant explanations. 
Unlike the Canadian Election 
Studies, it is important to note that the 
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CPEP is conducted online and 
administered after provincial elections. 
For instance, the 2012 Quebec survey was 
launched immediately following the 
September 4th provincial election and was 
in the field for slightly more than one 
month. In total, this survey sampled 1,010 
respondents, the large majority of which 
(n=728) were drawn from an online panel 
of Canadians built through random phone 
invitations. The remainder of the sample 
was randomly recruited through the use 
of Interactive Voice Response technology. 
The survey was made available in both 
French and English and the data were 
collected through an Internet survey 
platform licensed by Abacus Data.  
 
Findings 
 
Our analysis begins by comparing 
Quebecers’ and other Canadians’ affective 
orientations toward their federal and 
respective provincial political 
communities using a variety of measures 
that are typically employed in the 
literature.9 For instance, most Canadian 
studies tend to focus on feeling 
thermometers (Kornberg et al. 1979, 
1992; Nadeau and Bélanger 2012), while 
cross-national studies rely more on 
indicators such as pride and identification 
with the community (Dalton, 2004: 44). In 
this analysis, we examine all three.  The 
results in Table 1 start by illustrating the 
extent to which Quebecers and Canadians 
in other provinces like or dislike their 
federal and provincial political 
communities on a 100-point feeling 
thermometer. Note that although there 
are several observable distinctions across 
different provinces, some of the most 
striking differences are between Quebec 
and other provinces in the rest of Canada 
(ROC) and between Francophones and 
Anglophones in Quebec. 
 More specifically, the evidence in 
Table 1 suggests that Quebecers still 
“like” their provincial political community 
(80.4 points) more than they like Canada 
(60.5 points). In most other provinces for 
which we have data, the opposite is true.  
Most Canadians outside of Quebec 
typically like their country more than 
their province.  In certain provinces such 
as Ontario and Manitoba, these 
differences are more notable than in 
Saskatchewan, PEI or Alberta.  Still, the 
only exception is Newfoundland and 
Labrador where citizens are an average of 
five points more fond of their province 
than their country.10  Notice too that 
variations in support for the Canadian 
and provincial political communities are 
much greater in Quebec than in other 
provinces. Moreover, relative to citizens 
in a sample of other Canadian provinces, 
Quebecers are not only much less likely to 
indicate that they are fond of the 
Canadian political community (by an 
average of nearly 29 points) but they are 
also less inclined to indicate that they like 
their own provincial political community 
(by an average of 5 points). So according 
to this evidence, Quebecers are less 
supportive of both their federal and 
provincial communities than other 
Canadians.  Furthermore, there are also 
major differences between Francophones 
and Anglophones within Quebec.  The 
former are even more negative about 
Canada (55.3 points) and slightly more 
positive about Quebec (83.1 points) than 
Quebecers overall. And Anglophones are 
much more positive about Canada (87.5 
points) and much more negative about 
the way they perceive Quebec (65.2 
points).  
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Table 1. Changes in Feelings toward Canada and the Province, 1974-2012 
 
 
 
 
2011/2012 
 
∆ from 1974 
 
∆ from 1993 
 
∆ from 1997 
 
∆ from 2006 
 
Canada 
 
Province 
 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Canada 
 
Province 
 
Canada 
 
Province 
 
Canada 
 
Province 
 
Canada 
 
Province 
All Quebecers 60.5 
 
80.4 
 
-19.9*** 
 
-14.0 
 
9.5 
 
-3.6 
 
2.9 
 
-8.0 
 
-2.4 
 
-16.5 
 
1.0 
Francophones 55.3 
 
83.1 
 
-27.8*** 
 
-16.3 
 
10.7 
 
-6.0 
 
4.0 
 
-10.1 
 
-1.1 
 
-18.7 
 
3.5 
Anglophones 87.5   65.2   22.3*** 
 
-2.8   3.5 
 
3.2   -1.2 
 
0.3   -2.9 
 
-4.4   -13.2 
All ROC 89.4 
 
85.6 
 
3.8*** 
 
2.1 
 
4.7 
 
25.3 
 
4.0 
 
1.8 
 
-7.6 
 
2.0 
  Ontario 89.2 
 
80.5 
 
8.7*** 
 
-1.5 
 
1.0 
 
3.9 
 
1.6 
 
1.0 
 
-15.8 
 
-0.6 
  PEI 90.6 
 
88.9 
 
1.6* 
 
4.7 
 
3.1 
 
4.8 
 
0.9 
 
6.0 
 
-9.5 
 
-0.8 
  NFLD & Labrador 87.3 
 
92.5 
 
-5.2*** 
 
11.1 
 
10.5 
 
4.3 
 
7.0 
 
0.8 
 
1.2 
 
-1.9 
  Manitoba 90.7 
 
82.8 
 
7.9*** 
 
4.0 
 
3.4 
 
3.3 
 
0.4 
 
2.0 
 
-4.0 
 
6.3 
  Saskatchewan 91.4 
 
89.9 
 
1.5** 
 
5.0 
 
8.5 
 
7.0 
 
11.3 
 
3.6 
 
4.4 
 
1.7 
  Alberta 88.1   83.6   4.5*** 
 
3.3   -1.2 
 
4.1   2.6 
 
1.4   -8.1 
 
-1.2     
Questions: "Using a 100-point scale, where zero means that you really dislike the country, province or group and 100 means that you really like it, how do you feel about the following?"; All language 
questions based on language spoken at home. The 2004-2006 CES survey question asks what language was first learned and still spoken. 
T-test: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
Source: CPEP: Quebec 2012, Saskatchewan 2011, NFLD and Labrador 2011, Manitoba 2011, PEI 2011, Ontario 2011, Alberta 2012; CES: 2004-2006; 1997; 1993; 1974 
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Note too that when compared to 
past data as introduced at the outset of 
this article (Kornberg Clarke and Stewart 
1979; Nadeau and Bélanger 2012)11, 
these results suggest that support for the 
Canadian political community in Quebec 
has declined once again and that it is now 
lower than it was following the failed 
Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. 
More specifically, the CPEP evidence 
demonstrates that support for the 
Canadian political community in Quebec 
is currently 14 points lower than in 1974 
(74 points), nearly four points lower than 
in 1993 (64 points), seven points lower 
than in 1997 (68 points), and 16 points 
lower than in 2006 (77 points).  When it 
comes to other provinces, the aggregate 
cross-time findings relating to support for 
the Canadian political community have 
been much more stable.  In terms of 
outlooks toward provincial communities, 
the evidence indicates that between 1974 
and 1997, Quebecers’ average ratings of 
their province increased from 70 to 82 
points and that support has remained 
reasonably consistent since.  In the other 
provinces, the aggregate cross-time 
findings suggest that citizens’ feelings 
toward their provinces also increased on 
average from 80 to 93 points from 1974 
to 1997.  However, after that, the 
proportion of Canadians outside of 
Quebec who like their provinces has 
decreased by nearly 8 points.   
 When we examine the extent to 
which Canadians and Quebecers 
“identify” with the federal and respective 
provincial political communities, we are 
more limited in the number of cross-time 
data points that we have for analysis. 
Nonetheless, regarding current 
orientations, we find essentially the same 
patterns, with only minor differences12. 
For instance, as illustrated in Table 1, 
Table 2 suggests that Quebecers’ affective 
orientations toward the Canadian political 
community are lower than toward the 
provincial community. More specifically, 
they are much less likely to identify with 
Canada (63%) than they are with Quebec 
(91%). Conversely, the aggregate results 
for Canadians’ orientations toward the 
provincial or national political community 
in most other provinces are almost 
identical.  About nine in ten Canadians 
outside of Quebec identify with both their 
federal (94%) and provincial (91%) 
political communities. Note however that 
these findings suggest that Quebecers are 
as likely to identify with their provincial 
political community as other Canadians. 
So unlike the feeling thermometer results, 
these data suggest that Quebecers are no 
less supportive of their provincial 
political community than other 
Canadians.  On the differences between 
linguistic groups, these results show that 
the same group differences between 
Francophones and Anglophones exist as 
measured by the feelings thermometer. 
Francophones are even less likely to 
identify with Canada (58%) and more 
likely to identify with Quebec (95%) than 
Quebecers overall. And Anglophones are 
more likely to identify with Canada (92%) 
and less likely to identify with Quebec 
(65%). In addition, note that the gap 
between provincial and national 
community support is once again greater 
for Francophones than Anglophones. 
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Table 2.  Support for the Canadian and Provincial Political Community, 2011/2012  
 
  
Canada 
 
Province 
 
Differences in Support 
  
Feelings 
(means) 
Identification 
(%) 
Pride 
(%) 
 
Feelings 
(means) 
Identification 
(%) 
Pride 
(%) 
 
Feelings 
(mean) 
Identification 
(%) 
Pride 
(%) 
All Quebecers 
 
60.5 63% 65% 80.4 91% 89% -19.9*** -28*** -24*** 
  
(1,004) (1,001) (1,010)  (1,002) (1,002) (1,010)     
Francophones 
 
55.3 58% 60%  83.1 95% 93%  -27.8*** -37*** -33*** 
 
 
(832) (828) (837)  (831) (830) (837)     
Anglophones 
 
87.5 92% 92%  65.2 65% 62%  22.3*** 27*** 30*** 
 
 
(119) (120) (120)  (118) (120) (120)     
All ROC   89.4 94%   85.6 91%   3.8** 3***  
  
(4,712) (4,761)   (4,714) (4,779)      
Ontario 
 
89.2 96%   80.5 84%   8.7*** 12***  
 
 
(980) (986)   (976) (987)      
PEI 
 
90.6 93%   88.9 92%   1.6* 1  
 
 
(484) (502)   (486) (507)      
NFLD and 
Labrador 
 
87.3 83%   92.5 95%   -5.2*** -12***  
 
 
(811) (826)   (819) (833)      
Manitoba 
 
90.7 95%   82.8 91%   7.9*** 4***  
 
 
(769) (774)   (762) (774)      
Saskatchewan 
 
91.4 97%   89.9 95%   1.5** 2*  
 
 
(795) (801)   (798) (803)      
Alberta 
 
88.1 96%   83.6 88%   4.5*** 8***  
 
 
(873) (872)   (873) (875)      
Questions: Feelings: "Using a 100-point scale, where zero means that you really dislike the country, province or group and 100 means that you really like it, how do you feel about the 
following?"; Identification: "How much do you identify with each of the following?": % that responds "a great deal" or "quite a lot"; Pride: "How much pride do you take in each of the 
following?": % that respond "a great deal" or "quite a lot" 
T-test: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 sample sizes in (parentheses) 
Source: CPEP Quebec 2012, Saskatchewan 2011, NFLD and Labrador 2011, Manitoba 2011, PEI 2011, Ontario 2011, Alberta 2012 
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Another way to measure support 
for political communities is through 
sentiments of pride. In this case, the CPEP 
does not allow us to compare the amount 
of pride that Quebecers and other 
Canadians take in Canada and their 
respective provincial communities, as 
measures of pride were not included on 
survey instruments that were 
administered outside of Quebec. Still the 
data that we have are important to 
examine because they provide another 
useful test within Quebec. Note first that 
the results in Table 2 indicate that 
Quebecers take much less pride in Canada 
(65%) than in Quebec (89%). Note, too, 
that Francophones have even less pride in 
Canada (60%) and much more pride in 
Quebec (93%). And the opposite is true 
for Anglophones. More than nine in ten 
Anglophones in Quebec (92%) indicate 
that they take some pride in Canada, 
whereas 62% contend that they take 
pride in Quebec. Lastly, note that the gaps 
between how much pride different 
Quebecers take in the Canadian versus 
the Quebec political communities range 
from 24% to 33% and that they are 
greater once again for Francophones than 
Anglophones. 
 These findings clearly lend further 
support to the earlier claims made by 
others (Kornberg, Clarke and Stewart 
1979; Johnston 1986; Kornberg and 
Clarke 1992; Nadeau and Bélanger 2012). 
More specifically, our data suggest that 
support for political communities may not 
always be as consistently strong and 
stable as the general literature on political 
support purports.   For one thing, support 
for different political communities varies 
across different provinces and in this 
respect the differences between 
Quebecers and other Canadians are 
exceptionally striking.  Also, the evidence 
indicates that support for political 
communities can shift over time and this 
support varies considerably for different 
groups within Quebec.  
  So what accounts for these 
differences? Data from the Quebec 
component of the CPEP allow us to 
explore a variety of plausible explanations 
including some theoretically relevant 
performance-related possibilities13. For 
instance, respondents were asked about 
their perceptions of federalism and 
specifically the workings of inter-
governmental relations14. Do Quebecers 
think that their various levels of 
government are “working extremely well 
together” or “not working well at all”? The 
results in Table 3 point to two key 
findings. The first is that although there 
are some aspects of inter-governmental 
relations that Quebecers think are 
working better than others, on balance 
the results indicate that perceptions are 
more negative than not. For instance, only 
a small majority of Quebecers indicate 
that relations between their municipal 
and provincial governments (56%) and 
among different municipal governments 
(52%) are working well. In other 
respects, views on intergovernmental 
relations are even less rosy. Only 23% of 
Quebecers feel that relations between 
their provincial and federal governments 
are working well. Only one in five 
Quebecers (21%) feels that same way 
about relations between their municipal 
and federal governments. And only 37% 
of Quebecers feel that their provincial 
government works well with other 
provincial governments.  
The second key finding illustrated 
by this measure is that Anglophones are 
far more critical than Francophones in 
their evaluations of intergovernmental 
relations. On the whole, only a minority of 
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Anglophones feels that inter-
governmental relations are working well.  
More specifically, only 37% of the English 
speaking community in Quebec respond 
optimistically about relations between 
their municipal and provincial 
governments. Even more problematic to 
Anglophones are the perceptions that 
relations are working well between 
provincial and federal governments 
(18%) and municipal and federal 
governments (20%). Slightly more 
satisfactory to Anglophones are the 
relations among governments at the same 
level. And, while just under a majority 
(45%) perceive relations positively 
between municipal governments, only 
27% of English-speaking Quebecers feel 
that relations between provincial 
governments are working well. Moreover, 
based on these results it is certainly 
plausible that perceptions of 
underperformance of inter-governmental 
relations have some role to play in 
explaining variations in support for the 
federal and provincial political 
communities in Quebec. These results 
lend further support to the claims made 
by Kornberg, Clarke and Stewart (1979) 
about perceptions of inequalities 
resulting from federalism. 
 Also within the Quebec component 
of the CPEP, there is a battery of 
questions that allows us to tap another 
aspect of the workings of federalism. 
These questions ask respondents about 
the current power structure in the 
Canadian political community and 
whether they think that it requires any 
change. Assessments such as these are 
likely based on people’s perceptions of 
how the current political system performs 
and they too may affect support for 
political communities. Note, first, that few 
are completely satisfied with maintaining 
the status quo except with regards to how 
much “power and say” municipal 
governments have in the national political 
community (61%). And even then, at least 
one in three Quebecers (33%) feels that 
municipal governments should have more 
influence. Conversely, more than a 
majority of Quebecers (55%) feel that 
their provincial government should have 
more power and say in the Canadian 
political system. And a sizeable 
proportion of Quebecers (45%) feel that 
the federal government should have less 
power and say than it currently has. 
Moreover, when we examine these data 
by language groups, the results indicate 
that Francophones (63%) are even more 
supportive of giving the provincial 
government greater influence in the 
Canadian political community and of 
reducing the current influence of the 
federal government (50%). Most 
Anglophones on the other hand would 
prefer to retain the current power 
balance within the Canadian political 
community, where more than a majority 
respond that the “power and say” of each 
the municipal (62%), the provincial 
(62%) and the federal (62%) 
governments should remain the same.  
Notice too that Anglophones are slightly 
more inclined than Francophones to want 
to reduce the current influence of the 
municipal (11%) and provincial (23%) 
governments (compared to 4% for 
Francophones). But a larger proportion of 
Anglophones than Francophones would 
like the federal government to have more 
“power and say” (22% compared to 8%).
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 Table 3. Potential Explanations of Support for Political Community, 2012 
 
 
 
  
Quebecers 
(1,010) 
 
Francophones 
(837) 
 
Anglophones 
(120) 
Support for the workings of federalism (working well) 
"How would you rate the working relationships between…" 
the municipal government and the provincial government 
 
56% 
 
59% 
 
37% 
the provincial government and the federal government 
 
23% 
 
23% 
 
18% 
the municipal government and the federal government 
 
21% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
the municipal government and other municipal governments 
 
52% 
 
54% 
 
45% 
the provincial government and other provincial governments   37%   39%   27% 
Support for the power structure in the political community  
"Do you think the following should have more, less, or about the same power and say in the Canadian political community?" 
Municipal government 
      more 
 
33% 
 
34% 
 
27% 
about the same as now 
 
61% 
 
62% 
 
62% 
less 
 
5% 
 
4% 
 
11% 
Provincial government 
      more 
 
55% 
 
63% 
 
15% 
about the same as now 
 
37% 
 
33% 
 
62% 
less 
 
7% 
 
4% 
 
23% 
Federal government 
      more 
 
11% 
 
8% 
 
22% 
about the same as now 
 
44% 
 
42% 
 
62% 
less   45%   50%   16% 
Specific support (mean scores: 0 = low support; 1 = high support) 
Democratic Regime Principles 
      Canada 
 
.83 
 
.82 
 
.85 
Quebec 
 
.81 
 
.81 
 
.84 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
      Canada 
 
.49 
 
.47 
 
.55 
Quebec 
 
.58 
 
.59 
 
.55 
Confidence in Government Institutions 
      Canada 
 
.51 
 
.50 
 
.59 
Quebec 
 
.56 
 
.58 
 
.46 
Confidence in Political Leaders 
      Canada (PM) 
 
.38 
 
.36 
 
.45 
Quebec (Premier) 
 
.53 
 
.57 
 
.29 
Confidence in Elected Representatives 
      Canada (MP) 
 
.55 
 
.54 
 
.57 
Quebec (MNA)   .57   .58   .55 
Note: Where decimals are greater than 0.6, values are rounded up. 
Source: CPEP Quebec 2012 
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The second variant of the performance-
based argument suggested that how 
Quebecers feel about their federal and 
provincial communities may at least 
partly be shaped by what they think about 
more specific objects such as democracy 
as a regime, the way their democracy 
works, as well as the amount of 
confidence they place in their government 
institutions more generally and in their 
political authorities (Kornberg and Clarke 
1992; Norris 1999, 2011; Dalton 2004, 
2011). The final set of findings in Table 3 
present each of these possibilities using 
aggregate scales that are standardized 
from 0, meaning low support, to 1, 
meaning high support15.  The first point to 
note is that average support for 
democracy in principle is strong and 
virtually consistent in both the Canadian 
(.83) and Quebec (.81) political 
communities. The same applies when we 
unpack these data for different language 
groups. Average Quebecers, both 
Francophone and Anglophone, strongly 
prefer democracy as a system of political 
decision-making and governance to other 
more authoritative alternatives.  When we 
look at how satisfied citizens are with the 
way that their federal and provincial 
democracies work in practice, however, 
the findings are neither as strong nor as 
consistent. On average, Quebecers appear 
only moderately satisfied (.49) with the 
way that Canadian democracy works and 
they are not all that much more satisfied 
with the way that democracy works in 
Quebec (.58). When we examine the 
results for different language groups, the 
evidence shows that average 
Francophones are slightly less satisfied 
with the way that Canadian democracy 
works (.47) and slightly more satisfied 
with the way that democracy works in 
Quebec (.59). The average Anglophone on 
the other hand makes virtually no 
distinction between how the federal (.55) 
and provincial (.55) political systems 
work and in both instances they are 
moderately satisfied. 
  With respect to Quebecers’ 
confidence in their various governmental 
institutions, such as the federal and 
provincial governments, political parties, 
civil service, and legislative assemblies, 
the results are quite similar. The average 
Quebecer seems only moderately 
confident in federal government 
institutions (.51) and just slightly more 
confident in their provincial government 
institutions (.56). Moreover, the results 
for Francophones are not all that different 
from average Quebecers. However, 
average Anglophones are slightly more 
distinct in the confidence they place in 
their government institutions. More 
specifically, the gap between levels is 
larger and they report having more 
confidence in federal government 
institutions (.59) than in their provincial 
government institutions (.46). 
 With regard to political 
authorities, views tend to be more 
negative when it comes to political 
leaders than toward elected 
representatives. Compared to the other 
specific political objects presented here, 
the average Quebecer expresses a much 
lower degree of confidence in the 
Canadian Prime Minister (.38). Notice 
however that average Quebecers 
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tend to be slightly more confident in their 
Premier (.53)16, their Members of 
Parliament (MPs) (.55), and Members of 
the National Assembly (MNAs) (.57). 
Virtually the same is true for average 
Francophones while Anglophones on the 
other hand are slightly more positive 
about the Canadian Prime Minister (.45) 
but have even less confidence in the 
provincial Premier (.29) than average 
Francophones do in the Canadian Prime 
Minister (.36). Finally, Anglophones are 
slightly more confident in their MPs (.57) 
but less confident in MNAs (.55) than 
Francophones. 
 We now turn to examine whether 
these performance-based indicators are 
in fact associated with support for the 
Canadian and provincial political 
communities in Quebec17. Table 4 reports 
the results of a regression analysis that 
investigates the explanatory power of 
these arguments while controlling for a 
variety of structural, cultural and 
contextual factors. Note first, that the 
most consistent contextual determinants 
of support for the Canadian and 
provincial political communities in 
Quebec are party identification and 
language. As expected, Quebecers with 
separatist party attachments18 are less 
likely to be supportive of the Canadian 
political community and they are more 
supportive of Quebec. Also, Anglophones 
are more likely than Francophones to 
support the Canadian political community 
and not as likely to support the Quebec 
political community. Furthermore, 
another consistent contextual finding 
suggests that Allophones are more likely 
than Francophones to support the 
Canadian political community and less 
likely to support Quebec. There is no 
denying therefore that the presence of 
separatist parties and different language 
groups, each with their respective 
experiences and goals, has an important 
influence on how Quebecers view their 
federal and provincial political 
communities.  Note too, that two out of 
three of these factors have more powerful 
effects on support for the Canadian 
political community than they do on 
support for the provincial political 
community. Consider also that there are 
other contextual factors such as age, 
gender, and income that turn out to be 
significant, but their effects are not nearly 
as consistent nor as powerful.19 
 In addition, our results show no 
consistent and robust structural and 
culture change effects, which suggests 
that these types of explanations may not 
have direct implications for diffuse 
political support. But this is an 
interpretation that we have yet to 
investigate in much more detail (in other 
contexts for instance). The only 
significant findings suggest that greater 
cognitive mobilization leads to more 
support for the provincial political 
community and that greater respect for 
authority and inter-personal trust are 
linked to more support for Canada. 
  
206 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Support for the Canadian and Provincial Political Communities in Quebec 
(OLS Regression Analysis), 2012 
 
Determinants 
 
Canada 
 
Quebec 
Performance-based explanations 
 
B SE B  B SE B 
Intergovernmental relations (working well) 
 
.23 (.04)*** 
 
.10 (.03)** 
More power/say in municipal govt. (vs. less) 
 
.02 (.02) 
 
-.003 (.02) 
More power/say in provincial govt. (vs. less) 
 
-.12 (.03)*** 
 
.17 (.02)*** 
More power/say in federal govt. (vs. less) 
 
.15 (.02)*** 
 
-.04 (.02)* 
Specific support (strong) 
 
.38 (.05)*** 
 
.24 (.05)*** 
       Structural and cultural change explanations 
      Cognitive mobilization (high) 
 
-.02 (.04) 
 
.12 (.03)*** 
Efficacy gap (high internal) 
 
-.04 (.04) 
 
-.002 (.04) 
Post-materialism (pm values) 
 
-.03 (.02) 
 
.008 (.02) 
Respect for authority (good thing) 
 
.07 (.02)** 
 
.03 (.02) 
Interpersonal trust (high) 
 
.03 (.02)* 
 
.004 (.01) 
Media exposure (high) 
 
.04 (.01) 
 
.03 (.04) 
       Contextual explanations 
      Party ID (separatist) 
 
-.28 (.01)*** 
 
.07 (.02)*** 
Gender (Female)  .03 (.01)*  .03 (.01)** 
Anglophone (vs Francophone) 
 
.11 (.02)*** 
 
-.12 (.02)*** 
Allophone (vs Francophone) 
 
.13 (.03)*** 
 
-.09 (.03)** 
Age (young) 
 
-.03 (.01) 
 
-.04 (.02)** 
Immigrant (vs. Canadian born) 
 
-.003 (.02) 
 
.03 (.02) 
Income (high) 
 
.04 (.02)* 
 
-.02 (.02) 
       Constant 
 
.36 (.05)*** 
 
.42 (.04)*** 
R2 
 
.65 
  
.44 
 Adjusted R2 
 
.64   
 
 .43   
N 
 
842   
 
840   
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
      Source: CPEP Quebec 2012             
 
The most important findings in 
this analysis indicate that even after 
controlling for a variety of alternative 
explanations, several performance-based 
explanations turn out to have significant, 
consistent and powerful effects on 
support for the Canadian and provincial 
political communities. For example, the  
 
more positive Quebecers are about the 
workings of inter-governmental relations, 
the more inclined they are to support 
both their federal and provincial political 
communities.  Also, Quebecers who feel 
that the provincial government should 
have more power and say in the Canadian 
political system are less likely to support 
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Canada, but more likely to support 
Quebec.  Conversely, Quebecers who feel 
that the federal government should have 
more power and say in the Canadian 
political system, are more likely to 
support the Canadian political community 
and less likely to support Quebec.  Lastly, 
the most robust finding overall suggests 
that when specific support is strong, 
support for both the Canadian and 
provincial political communities in 
Quebec benefits.  More specifically, the 
more supportive Quebecers are of their 
regime principles, the way their 
democracy works, their government 
institutions more generally and their 
political authorities, the more likely they 
are to support both Canada and Quebec. 
Note too that in most cases the effects of 
these factors are much stronger on 
support for the Canadian political 
community than they are on support for 
the provincial political community20.  
 
Implications 
 
These findings make several 
contributions to the literature on political 
support. First they verify once again that 
support for different political 
communities varies and in several ways 
(across provinces, over time and across 
different sub-national political 
communities or groups). Also, these 
findings show that performance-based 
arguments have a significant bearing on 
support for political communities in 
Quebec, even after controlling for various 
contextual, structural and cultural 
arguments. More specifically, the findings 
from this analysis suggest that when 
Quebecers view the workings of inter-
governmental relations negatively, it has 
significant implications for support for 
political communities. Also, Quebecers 
who feel that the structure of power 
relations between the federal and 
provincial governments needs to be 
adjusted are less likely to be supportive of 
these political communities. But most 
importantly, when Quebecers lack 
support for specific political objects they 
are less likely to support their respective 
federal and provincial political 
communities. Moreover, most of these 
factors have much more powerful 
consequences for support for the 
Canadian political community than they 
do on support for the provincial political 
community.  
The results of this analysis suggest 
that support for various political 
communities may not be driven primarily 
by demographic/political differences or 
by shifting political cultures. Rather, our 
findings suggest that low support for 
political communities may be addressed 
and redirected by strengthening political 
performance and better meeting the 
performance expectations of citizens, 
regardless of the growing diversity of 
those expectations (Farnsworth 2003; 
Dalton 2004). Of course more research is 
still required.  For instance, in the future, 
it would be valuable to test the 
generalizability of these findings in other 
provinces. Also, more research on what 
citizens would consider to be better 
performance would also be extremely 
valuable when it comes to designing and 
implementing any future democratic 
reforms.  Future variants of the CPEP 
should be vital in both of these respects21. 
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Endnotes 
1 As highlighted in important works such as 
Kenneth McRoberts’ (1997) Misconceiving Canada: 
The Struggle for National Unity, Clarke et al.’s 
(2000) A Polity on the Edge: Canada and the 
Politics of Fragmentation and Nelson Wiseman’s 
(2008) In Search of Canadian Political Culture, to 
name only a few. 
2 Norris (2011: 24-25) suggests that support for 
different objects may be observed as follows: 
“Political community: “belonging to the nation-
state, exemplified by feelings of national pride, 
patriotism and identity”; Regime principles: 
approval or not of the principles associated with a 
democratic system of governance or other regime 
type; Regime performance: evaluations of the 
“workings” of the regime; Regime institutions: 
confidence in government, parliaments, parties, 
the civil service, the courts, and the security 
forces; Authorities: trust in elected and appointed 
office‐holders, including leaders and elected 
representatives.” 
3 Kornberg and Clarke (1992: 4) describe affective 
support as being “granted or withheld on the basis 
of powerful feelings of like or dislike – feelings 
grounded in the early socialization experiences of 
individuals…” 
4 For instance, Bill 99, a provincial law that affirms 
Quebec’s right to seek independence and to 
determine the conditions under which it would do 
so, has recently been challenged by the federal 
government (Wells 2013). 
5 Note however, that more recent evidence 
(Norris, 2011: 244) suggests that greater exposure 
to news has a positive effect on satisfaction with 
democracy.  
6 For a variety of reasons, such as more time spent 
watching TV and commuting from one place to the 
next. 
7 See, http://cpep.ualberta.ca/. 
8 See, http://ces-eec.org/ . 
9 Doing so allows us to also parcel out whether 
there are variations in the conclusions drawn 
about citizens’ affective orientations depending on 
the measure in use. 
10 While this may be partly attributable to the 
efforts of former Premier Danny Williams (The 
Globe and Mail 2010), these findings are not new 
and studies conducted as early as 1974 suggest 
the same trend in differences between feelings 
toward the provincial versus the national political 
communities in Newfoundland (Johnston 1986). 
This is also consistent with the findings on the 
identification measure presented in Table 2. 
11 This analysis has also been replicated using CES 
data from the 1974, 1993, 1997 and 2004-06 
surveys. Note that while different survey modes 
may introduce some error, identical survey 
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questions and the consistency of the resulting 
findings across time and across modes allow us to 
draw some generalizable conclusions. While there 
is significant debate about the pros and cons of 
different forms of data collection, recent tests have 
also demonstrated that findings collected using 
differing modes can be equally useful especially 
when care is taken to collect data from 
representative samples using identical question 
wording (see for instance Sanders et al. 2007 and 
Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2011). 
12 These data illustrate that respondents are 
consistent in their different orientations toward 
the Canadian community versus the provincial 
community regardless of the indicator used to 
measure those orientations. Note too that support 
in all provinces except Quebec is on average 
greater than 80 points on the 100 point scale and 
more than 80% support both communities across 
all provinces except in Quebec. 
13 The data presented in Table 3 illustrate basic 
variations in the performance questions 
highlighted in the literature and help to establish 
the plausibility that such variations may have an 
effect on support for the different political 
communities. These indicators are included later 
in our final analysis. 
14 CPEP surveys conducted in other provinces do 
not include this question. 
15 Evaluations of democracy in practice, the 
institutions of government, and the political 
authorities may be partly linked to feelings of 
cynicism toward government resulting from news 
of the ongoing Charbonneau Commission which is 
currently investigating allegations of corruption 
and collusion in government. 
16 And this is immediately after the new Premier, 
Pauline Marois, had just been elected. 
17 Support for community is an additive measure 
constructed using responses to the three 
questions presented in Table 2 (feelings, 
identification, and pride). The Cronbach’s Alpha 
for these indicators are .921 for Canada and .837 
for Quebec. 
18 In this review we measure individuals’ 
separatist attitudes by investigating whether they 
identified with a separatist party. This measure 
reflects both covert attitude and some overt desire 
to break up the Canadian political community. 
Inclusion of this measure as an independent 
variable in our model is based on the assumption 
that while Party ID (especially separatist party 
attachment) may be significantly linked to low 
levels of affective support for a Canadian 
community, support for either community may 
also be independently subject to other important 
theoretically relevant factors. When Party ID is 
removed, the story doesn’t change. A regression 
analysis run without this factor reveals that all 
other variables included retain the same 
significance in their effects on the outcome 
variable. 
19 For instance, the evidence indicates that 
younger Quebecers are less likely to support their 
provincial political community than older 
Quebecers.  And high income earners are more 
likely to support the Canadian political community 
than those who do not earn as much. 
20 We acknowledge that while data from a single 
time point may not provide adequate empirical 
evidence to support the direction of the causal 
effect of the relationships tested here and 
proposed by the literature, our findings are 
suggestive that a significant and strong 
relationship exists and that further analysis is 
warranted. 
21 A more recent study was conducted following 
the most recent 2014 election in Quebec which 
includes a battery of questions that do just this. 
Findings from this survey are forthcoming. 
                                                          
1 As hig hl ighte d in importa nt works such a s Kenneth McRobert s’ (1997) Mis co nceiving Canada: The Struggle fo r Nat ional Unity , Clarke et al.’s (2000) A Polity o n the Edge: Canada and the Politics o f Fragmentation a nd Nelson Wisema n’s ( 2008) In Search o f Canadian Political Cult ure, to name only a few.  
2 Norris (2011: 24- 25) sugge sts that support for diffe rent objects may be obse rve d as follows: “Pol itical community : “belonging to the nation-state, exemplified by fee lings of national pride, pat riot ism a nd ide ntity”; Reg ime principles: a pproval or not of the principle s associate d wit h a dem ocratic system of gove rnance or othe r reg ime t ype; R egime pe rforma nce: evaluations of the “workings” of the regime; R egime instit utions: confide nce in g overnme nt, parl iament s, part ies, the civ il se rvice, the courts, a nd 
the security force s; Aut horitie s: trust in elected a nd a ppointe d office‐holders, including leade rs a nd elected re pre se ntative s.” 
3 Kornbe rg and Clarke (1992: 4) describe a ffective support a s be ing “g ra nted or wit hhe ld on the ba sis of powerful feel ing s of like or dislike – feel ing s grounded in t he early socia lization ex perie nces of individuals…”  
4 For instance, Bill 99, a provincial law t hat affirm s Quebec’s rig ht to see k inde pende nce and to dete rmine the condit ions under which it would do so, ha s recently bee n chal lenge d by the fe de ral gov ernment.  
5 Note howeve r, that more recent evide nce (Norris 2011: 244) sugge sts that g reater ex posure to ne ws ha s a positive effect on sa tisfaction wit h dem ocracy.  
6 For a va riety of rea sons suc h as more time spe nt watching TV and commut ing from one place to the next.  
7 See, http://cpe p.ua lbe rta.ca/. 
8 See, http://ces-eec.org / . 
9 Doing so allows us to also pa rcel out whet her t here a re variations in the conclusions dra wn a bout citizens’ affectiv e orientations de pe nding on t he meas ure in use.  
10 While this may be partly attributa ble to the e ffort s of former Premie r Da nny William s (T he Globe and Mail 2010), these findings are not new a nd studie s conducted as ea rly a s 1974 sugge st the same trend in differe nces betwee n feel ing s toward the provincial versus the nationa l political c ommunitie s in Newfoundland (Johnston 1986). This is also consiste nt with t he fi ndings on t he ide ntification measure prese nted in Ta ble 2.  
11 This a naly sis ha s also been replicated using CES data from the 1974, 1993, 1997 and 2004- 06 survey s. Note t hat while differe nt survey modes may introduce some error, ident ical surve y questions a nd the consistency of the re sulting findings across time and across modes al low us to dra w some ge neraliza ble conclusions. While the re is sig nifica nt de bate about the pros a nd cons of different form s of data collection, rece nt tests have also demonst rated t hat finding s collected using differing mode s can be 
equa lly use ful e specially whe n care is take n to collect data from representative sam ples using ide ntical que stion wording (see for insta nce Sanders et al. 2007 and A nsola behe re and Scha ffner 2011).  
12 These data illust rate that re sponde nts are consistent in their differe nt orientations toward the Cana dia n community v ersus the provincia l community regardle ss of the indicator used to mea sure those orie ntations. Note too that support in all provinces except Que bec is on ave rage greate r than 80 points on t he 100 point scale and more t han 80% support both communit ies across all provinces ex cept in Que bec. 
13 The data prese nte d in Ta ble 3 illust rate ba sic variations in t he pe rforma nce que stions highlig hted in the l iterat ure and helps to e stabl ish the pla usibi lity that such va riations may have an e ffect on support for the diffe rent pol itical communitie s. The se indicators are include d later in our final analy sis.  
14 CPEP surveys conducted in ot her provinces do not include this que stion. 
15 Evaluations of democracy in practice, the instit utions of g overnme nt, and t he political a uthorit ies may be pa rtly linke d to f eeling s of cy nicism towa rd g overnme nt resulting from news of the ongoing C harbonne au Commission which is curre ntly i nve stigating alle gations of corruption a nd collusion in g overnme nt. 
16 And t his is imme diately after t he ne w Premie r, Pauline Marois, ha d just been elected.  
17 Support for community is an a dditive mea sure constructed using responses to the t hree que stions prese nte d in Ta ble 2 (feel ings, identification, a nd pride). The Cronbach’ s Alpha for these indicators a re .921 for Ca nada a nd . 837 for Que bec. 
18 In this revie w we mea sure individuals’ se pa ratist attitude s by inve stigating whet her the y ide ntifie d wit h a se paratist pa rty. This measure reflects both cove rt attitude a nd some overt desire to brea k up the Cana dia n polit ical community. I nclusion of this mea sure as a n inde pe nde nt variable in our model is base d on the assumption t hat while Party ID (e specially se paratist pa rty attachment) may be significa ntly linked to low le vels of a ffective support for a Canadian comm unity, support for eithe r 
community may also be indepe ndently subject to other im portant t heoretically re leva nt factors. When Pa rty ID is remove d, the st ory doe sn’t cha nge. A reg ression a naly sis run wit hout this factor reveals that all othe r variable s include d retain the same sig nifica nce in their e ffects on t he out come varia ble.  
19 For instance, the evide nce indicates t hat younge r Quebece rs are less likely to support t heir provincial pol itical community tha n olde r Quebece rs.  And high income ea rne rs are more like ly to support the Ca nadian pol itical community t han t hose who do not earn as muc h. 
20 We acknowle dge that while data from a single time point may not provide a dequate empirical e vidence to support the direction of the causa l effect of the relationships teste d he re and propose d by the literat ure, our finding s are sugg estiv e that a sig nifica nt and strong relationship exist s and that furt her a naly sis is warrante d.  
21 A more recent study wa s conducted following the m ost rece nt 2014 election in Quebec whic h includes a battery of questions tha t do just this. Finding s from this survey are fort hcomi ng.  
